9/11 Commission Report
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9/11 Commission Report
| Fri, 07-23-2004 - 4:20am |
Any thoughts on the 9/1 Commission Report and particularly its recommendations?
Does the fact that it was unanimous and bi-partisan make it less interesting?
C
Edited 7/23/2004 4:25 am ET ET by car_al

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C
IMO Al Jazerra shouldn't be the only source defining what America stands for in the Arab world. The US should be broadcasting its message in local languages to this audience.
As far as Saudi Arabia, its support for the Madrasses should be questioned and challenged by our government.
Pakistan with its nuclear capabilities is more than a little scary and my criticism of our "pre-emptive war" strategy, noted our example to Pakistan.
C
I would have thought that the commission would have insisted on extreme cooperation and sharing of intelligence between the CIA and FBI, in effect tearing down the "Gorelick" wall between the two (sorry, just referring to it as it was during the hearings).
I dont think adding another bureaucrat to the mix is going to solve anything, except make government even larger.
I would have thought that the commission would have insisted on extreme cooperation and sharing of intelligence between the CIA and FBI, in effect tearing down the "Gorelick" wall between the two (sorry, just referring to it as it was during the hearings).
I dont think adding another bureaucrat to the mix is going to solve anything, except make government even larger."
Debateguy,
I agree that adding yet another bureaucrat is probably not the answer, it just seems to add one more level to get through. However, I have a hard time envisioning how to get better sharing and cooperation between the CIA and FBI as I do not understand their hierachy. Are there people, or a person, from each agency that you would appoint this information sharing task, or are you suggesting that information that each agency decides needs to be red flags simply gets copied to all higher positions in each agency? I'm wondering what others have to say about this also. Not having read the commissions report, it seems to me that from what I've heard, this could be one of the most important steps taken to continue to improve the security of our country. Am I wrong?
If it is a directive from a cabinet position, the agencies should have to comply.
I would say what Reagan said to Gorbachev "Tear down this wall!".
The key is to REMOVE the bureaucracy or red tape, and force them to work more closely on sharing intel and info.
"The panel did not address the root causes of the Sept. 11 attacks. Dealing with them is the only way to reduce the chances of terrorist attacks in the first place. "
The 9/11 Commission Findings
Report omits key player -- foreign policy
Ivan Eland
Tuesday, July 27, 2004
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Although the 9/11 commission's investigation has won praise in the media for being bipartisan, on balance it has not made us safer. The commission discovered new information to rewrite the history of the Sept. 11 attacks, uncovered government incompetence that should make Americans wonder if those attacks could have been prevented and made some useful recommendations. But the panel avoided the most important question surrounding the attacks -- their cause.
The commission showed that the Bush administration, in the months prior to Sept. 11, had much more warning of an impending terrorist attack than previously known. The panel also correctly criticized the performance of U.S. intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, aviation security and the military prior to or on that horrible day. Finally, the commission made useful recommendations to safeguard American liberties -- rejecting a dangerous new domestic spy agency and arguing for improved congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland security agencies.
But like many government and quasi-government bodies after Sept. 11, the 9/11 commission focused on dubious recommendations about what the authorities could do to improve their response to terrorism instead of the more important question of what the government could do to reduce the chances of an attack in the first place. For example, the commission recommended creating a new national counterterrorism center to coordinate foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism and a new national intelligence director, who would control the myriad of intelligence agencies and their budgets. Like the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, however, both of these proposed reforms would add a layer of bureaucracy, exacerbating the governmental coordination problems discovered by the commission itself. To fight small, agile terrorism groups, the government should cut the excessive number of intelligence bureaucracies, not create more.
The director of central intelligence, in addition to being the president's chief adviser on intelligence and the head of the CIA, is already supposed to be riding herd on the existing 15 intelligence agencies. Yet the director is not allowed to make the critical personnel and budgetary decisions concerning those agencies because they are parts of other organizations. The Department of Defense, for example, controls 85 percent of the U.S. intelligence budget. Instead of creating a new national intelligence chief, the director should just be given the powers required to do his current job.
To reduce the coordination and communication problems among intelligence agencies that occurred prior to Sept. 11, the excessive number of intelligence agencies should be streamlined and consolidated. Intelligence units in the Departments of Energy (which analyzes nuclear matters), State (which analyzes information related to U.S. foreign policy) and Treasury (which deals with information affecting U.S. fiscal and monetary policy) could be merged into the CIA. FBI counterespionage functions and Coast Guard Intelligence could be merged into the intelligence unit of the Department of Homeland Security. The intelligence arms of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps could be subsumed into the Defense Intelligence Agency, as could the National Reconnaissance Office (which builds satellites and coordinates collection of satellite and aerial intelligence), the National Security Agency (which collects signals intelligence from electronic transmissions) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (which does satellite imagery and mapping).
The greatest flaw in the commission's analysis and recommendations, however, was one of omission. The panel did not address the root causes of the Sept. 11 attacks. Dealing with them is the only way to reduce the chances of terrorist attacks in the first place.
In his statement upon release of the commission's report, Thomas Kean, the commission's chairman, incorrectly opined that the terrorists hate America and its policies. Even al Qaeda does not hate America per se. The group's statements indicate that it hates U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, especially the U.S. government's propping up of corrupt Arab regimes (such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt) for their perceived strategic significance. Furthermore, repeated polls in the Islamic world (including two polls in "friendly" Arab countries released last week by the University of Maryland and the Arab American Institute and Zogby International) indicate that the United States is hated not for its culture, technology or freedoms -- as President Bush would have us believe -- but for its foreign policy. The president has further inflamed that hatred with his illegitimate invasion of a sovereign Iraq -- a nation that had no weapons of mass destruction and that the 9/11 Commission said had no "collaborative relationship" with al Qaeda.
It is from this sea of hatred that the blowback terrorism of a small minority of individuals emanates. Ending longstanding U.S. government meddling in the Middle East would do more than any of the commission's recommendations to reduce terrorist attacks on innocent Americans.
Ivan Eland is director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute in Oakland (www.independent.org) and author of "Putting 'Defense' Back Into U.S. Defense Policy" (Praeger, 2001) and "The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed" (forthcoming in October).
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2004/07/27/EDGIJ7SHA41.DTL
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories/080304dnedicairtalk.a194b.html
Arsalan T. Iftikhar: Constant use of 'Islamist' overlooks real threats
By ARSALAN T. IFTIKHAR
With the anticipation of a New York Times best seller, the 9-11 Commission report did not disappoint an eager audience. The report chronicles in acute detail the chain of events leading up to the horrendous crimes perpetrated on Sept. 11, 2001.
In addition to practical recommendations, the commission stated a goal of preventing the growth of "Islamist terrorism." The commission concluded that the threat posed to the United States is not just "terrorism," but more specifically, "the catastrophic threat ... posed by Islamist terrorism."
At times, the report seems to contradict its claims, stating that "Islam is not the enemy," that Islam "is not synonymous with terror" and that America "and its friends oppose a perversion of Islam." Nonetheless, the commission seems to stigmatize anyone with ties to Islam.
A good portion of the commission's sentiments are completely understandable. Deviant criminals, proclaiming to act under the banner of any faith, should be swiftly brought to justice. Extremists who commit criminal acts and purport to be acting under Islamic tenets should be condemned by all of humanity.
Nonetheless, by associating the ill-defined "Islamist" modifier to define "terrorism," the commission has overlooked numerous precedents that show an entirely different historical record.
Prior to Sept. 11, the most catastrophic terrorist attack on American soil occurred on April 19, 1995, when Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. According to The Washington Post, investigators believe Eric Rudolph, the terrorist responsible for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing, was associated with the violent Christian Identity movement, which asserts that North European whites are "God's chosen people."
According to Professor Michael Barkun, author of Religion and the Racist Right, the apocalyptic and racist philosophy to which Eric Rudolph adhered "is practiced by more than 50,000 people in the United States alone; is prevalent among many right-wing extremist groups and has been called the 'glue' of the racist right."
In April 2003, William Krar of Noonday, Texas, was caught with an arsenal containing fully automatic machine guns, remote-controlled explosive devices disguised as briefcases, 60 pipe bombs and neo-Nazi literature. Mr. Krar possessed an actual chemical weapon – a cyanide bomb – big enough to kill everyone in a 30,000-square-foot building. Paul Krugman of The New York Times noted, "It's hard to believe that William Krar wouldn't have become a household name if he had been a Muslim."
The American Muslim community has always condemned and will continue to denounce terrorism in all of its forms, especially criminal acts committed in the "name" of Islam. We will continue to help protect our nation from all criminals and protect our faith from fringe elements. However, the term "Islamist terrorism" is nothing more than an oversimplification of our complex and kaleidoscopic national security paradigm.
As Americans, we must mobilize to help prevent acts of "terror" against our country based on criminal acts, not on demographic associations. If we keep our enthralled focus solely on terms such as "Islamist," it gives me great pause to then imagine the William Krars, Eric Rudolphs and Timothy McVeighs of our nation hiding in the corner, laughing at all of us and licking their terrorist chops.
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