Report Ends Much Debate
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Report Ends Much Debate
| Fri, 07-23-2004 - 5:47pm |
WOLFOWITZ--STRIKE BIN LADEN HARD
Richard Clarke has gone after Paul Wolfowitz very aggressively as Mr. Iraq who had no interest in bin Laden. But check out page 214, describing a pre-9/11 debate over the Predator. Wolfowitz wanted a robust military option:
"The Defense Department favored strong action. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz questioned the United States’ ability to deliver Bin Ladin and bring him to justice. He favored going after Bin Ladin as part of a larger air strike, similar to what had been done in the 1986 U.S. strike against Libya. General Myers emphasized the Predator’s value for surveillance, perhaps enabling broader air strikes that would go beyond Bin Ladin to attack al Qaeda’s training infrastructure."
http://www.nationalreview.com/thecorner/04_07_18_corner-archive.asp#036402
Richard Clarke has gone after Paul Wolfowitz very aggressively as Mr. Iraq who had no interest in bin Laden. But check out page 214, describing a pre-9/11 debate over the Predator. Wolfowitz wanted a robust military option:
"The Defense Department favored strong action. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz questioned the United States’ ability to deliver Bin Ladin and bring him to justice. He favored going after Bin Ladin as part of a larger air strike, similar to what had been done in the 1986 U.S. strike against Libya. General Myers emphasized the Predator’s value for surveillance, perhaps enabling broader air strikes that would go beyond Bin Ladin to attack al Qaeda’s training infrastructure."
http://www.nationalreview.com/thecorner/04_07_18_corner-archive.asp#036402
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Clinton & Bush both took the threat of Al Queda seriously but had different management styles:
"President Bill Clinton preferred reading detailed intelligence memos, which he marked up with notes and comments in order to receive written responses. President Bush sought early-morning, face-to-face briefings from CIA Director George J. Tenet.
Clinton tried to draw attention to the threat of terrorism by frequently mentioning it in speeches, but top aides would spend weeks or months arguing over the fine points in action memorandums -- which Clinton would tinker with before signing them. Bush was tired of "swatting flies" and wanted dramatic results, bristling at the tedium of interagency coordination. He saw little need for formal meetings, instead communicating with top officials via national security adviser Condoleezza Rice."
"The report, which noted that the "procedures of the Bush administration were at once more formal and less formal" than the Clinton operation, said that ultimately senior Bush officials never had a "formal, recorded decision not to retaliate" for the Cole attack. Instead, through conversations involving Rice and Bush, Bush and Tenet, and Rice, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, a consensus was reached that "tit-for-tat" responses would be counterproductive, the report said.
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Awesome summary of links.
Miffy - Co-CL For The Politics Today Board
Report supports CIA assertion that Atta did not meet with Iraqi intelligence:
"It largely discounted a reported meeting between hijacking leader Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi diplomat that was said to have taken place in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 9, 2001."
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"The commission also cited problems with accounts of the alleged meeting between hijack leader Atta and Iraqi diplomat Samir al Ani in Prague on April 9, 2001.
Although the Czech government initially said it had an eyewitness account of the meeting, the commission said cell phone records suggested Atta was in the United States at the time. Czech officials eventually produced information that indicated Ani wasn't at the embassy at the time the meeting was supposed to have taken place.
Moreover, Atta didn't turn up in surveillance photos taken of the embassy by the Czech government on the day of the alleged meeting."
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/politics/9229265.htm
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Edited 7/24/2004 11:37 am ET ET by cl-wrhen
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There was extensive contact between Al Queda & Iraq
< there were meetings between top al-Qaida operatives and Iraqi agents spanning some five years. At one point, as some members of the Taliban government in Afghanistan were pressuring al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden to leave the country, Iraqi officials may have offered him asylum, the commission said.
Contacts between al-Qaida and Iraq were initiated in 1994 or 1995 by Sudanese officials, who persuaded bin Laden to end his support for a radical Islamic group in northern Iraq that was opposed to Saddam. Bin Laden was living in Sudan at the time.
During this period, bin Laden met several times with Iraqi representatives in Sudan, requesting help in establishing al-Qaida training camps in Iraq, but apparently got no response.
In 1998, after bin Laden had moved to Afghanistan, Iraq began reaching out to him. The final commission report said an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan in July of that year to meet with officials of the Taliban government and bin Laden.
"Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and bin Laden or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some strains with the Taliban," said the commission, known formally as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. "According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered bin Laden a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Laden declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative.">
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/politics/9229265.htm
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Clinton intelligence about Sudan asprin factory questionable:
"In testimony before the commission March 17, former Defense Secretary William Cohen said soil samples from around the plant showed evidence of EMPTA, a component of nerve gas that doesn't occur naturally and has no commercial application. Cohen testified that the manager of the plant had gone to Baghdad to meet with the "father" of the Iraqi nerve-gas program and the plant appeared to have been financed at least partially by bin Laden.
Former President Clinton and former National Security Adviser Sandy Berger made the same assertion in testimony before the commission during private sessions.
Based on that evidence, the United States decided to attack the plant with cruise missiles on Aug. 20, 1998.
At a news conference Thursday, the chairman of the Sept. 11 commission, former New Jersey Gov. Thomas Kean, said intelligence from foreign sources contradicted some of the information by the U.S. government had gathered. He said the commission had concluded that it wasn't clear the plant was a nerve gas factory or that bin Laden had helped finance it.
"We gave weight to (Cohen's) testimony, and it's the same belief that President Clinton had, the same belief that Sandy Berger had," Kean said. "But there are a whole bunch of people on the other side who dispute that finding, who say there is no independent collaborative evidence that those chemicals were there. And this is a debate that goes on.""
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/politics/9229265.htm
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Islamofascists pose global threat:
"The threat of Islamist extremists taking over Pakistan or Saudi Arabia is real and could "fundamentally change the balance of security in the world," September 11 commission member John F. Lehman said yesterday. "
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040723-111419-2812r.htm
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(Your language) (then, no break, same paragraph)According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circunstances in Afghanstan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe freindly contacts and indicates some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks against the United States." pg. 66, Authorized Edition, The 9/11 Commission Report.
Read that? "Nor have we seen evidence indicating..." Not proving, not even "indicating."
What did you think? No one who comes on here would have the incentive to actually buy a copy of the report and read it?
You know what really comes clear after the first 115 pages I've read so far? That the Republicans in Congress were so anxious to get back in power, they spent valuable time and resources trying to impeach Bill Clinton, and that they ignored warnings about terror strikes from the CIA, the FBI, the White House, State and Defense. In their devisive attempts to smear a sitting President, and to play to a Republic audience about "values" they missed the chance to fund, direct and oversee the intelligence organizations they had reponsiblities for. What also comes clear is that the mistakes made during the Reagon years, including Iran-Contra and the Beirut massacre of the Marines and its' aftermath, contributed to the problems of every administration after it in forming policies and, futher, encouraged the Islamic terrorists.
And listen to this, in the final paragraph of 3, pg. 107:
"In fact, Congress had a distinct tendency to push quetions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving then for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissons to do the work that arguably was at the heart of its own oversight responsbilities. Baginning in 1999, the reports of these commissions made scores of recommendations to address terrorism and homeland security but drew little attention from Congress. Most of their impact came after 9/11."
Want to argue? Answer me this. Have you bought the report? Have you read it?
My bet? No and No.
We must engage Muslim governments and provide educational alternatives to the madrasses:
"The report calls for open confrontation of the "problems" in the U.S.-Saudi relationship and, in general, urges the United States to define its message to Muslim governments. Challenging the nation to "engage the struggle of ideas," the report also calls for funding literacy programs in the Arab world while also recognizing that "Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio."
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Musharaff is vital to the stability of Pakistan & Afghanistan:
While the final report says "Musharraf's government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan," it also notes that "vast unpoliced regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists."
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Why should I do that when it's
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